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Abstract
This article is a continuation of our promenade along the winding roads of iden-
tity, equality, nameability and completeness. We continue looking for a place
where all these concepts converge.
We assume that identity is a binary relation between objects while equality
is a symbolic relation between terms. Identity plays a central role in logic and
we have looked at it from two different points of view. In one case, identity is a
notion which has to be defined and, in the other case, identity is a notion used
to define other logical concepts.
In our previous paper, [16], we investigated whether identity can be intro-
duced by definition arriving to the conclusion that only in full higher-order logic
with standard semantics a reliable definition of identity is possible.
In the present study we have moved to modal logic and realized that here we
can distinguish in the formal language between two different equality symbols,
the first one shall be interpreted as extensional genuine identity and only applies
for objects, the second one applies for non rigid terms and has the characteristic of
synonymy. We have also analyzed the hybrid modal logic where we can introduce
rigid terms by definition and can express that two worlds are identical by using
the nominals and the @ operator.
We finish our paper in the kingdom of identity where the only primitives are
lambda and equality. Here we show how other logical concepts can be defined in
terms of the identity relation.
∗This research has been possible thanks to the research projects sustained by Min-
isterio de Economı´a y Competitividad of Spain with references FFI2013-47126-P and
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We have found at the end of our walk a possible point of convergence in the
logic Equational Hybrid Propositional Type Theory (EHPTT), [14] and [15].
Keywords: identity, equality, completeness, nameability, first-order modal
logic, hybrid logic, hybrid type theory, equational hybrid propositional type
theory
1. Introduction
We assume the distinction between identity and equality: the first is a
binary relation between objects while the second is a symbolic relation
between terms. Owing to the central role the notion of identity plays in
logic, you can be interested either in how to define it using other logical
concepts (identity as definiendum) or in the opposite scheme (identity as
definiens).
In our previous paper, Identity, equality, nameability and completeness,
[16], we focused on the definition of identity by means of other logical
concepts in classical logic (first-order logic as well as higher-order logic).
We concluded from this approach that, in case you want proper identity
as interpretation of equality, you need higher-order logic with standard
semantics.
The first part of this article is centered on the same issue but we have
moved from classical logic to modal logic and hybrid logic. In the last part
of this article, identity is not considered to be the definiendum but the
definiens. Identity is there taken as a primitive logical concept and hence
we are interested in the definition of the other logical concepts (connectives
and quantifiers) in terms of the equality symbol (interpreted as the identity
relation), using the lambda abstraction as well.
2. Identity and Equality in Modal Logic
In modal logic one can decide to keep the interpretation of equality as ex-
tensional identity so that the equality symbol that we have in the language
designates properly the “ontological” relation of identity which is only held
by an object with itself and with nothing more.1 As we saw in [16], in
first-order logic identity is taken as primitive because it is undefinible and
1That is the reason why Wittgenstein in [19] rejected the use of the equality sign:
“Identity of objects I express by identity of sign, and not by using a sign of identity.
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the calculus should include the rules of reflexivity of equality and equals
substitution. These two rules guarantee that equality is an equivalence re-
lation. Are they plausible axioms in modal contexts? What about formulas
with the box operator?
In case we wanted to interpret equality as proper identity, we must
ensure that the rules of necessity of identity (NI)
x = y → (x = y)
and substitutivity of identicals (SI)
x = y → (ϕ(x)→ ϕ(y))
are observed.
2.1. First-Order Modal Logic
The rule of the substitutivity of identicals (SI), which is close to a first-order
formulation of the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals – saying
that two objects are identical when there is no property able to distinguish
them – cannot capture completely the identity relation, even in classical
first-order logic.
On the other hand, the rule of the necessity of identity (NI) seems very
reasonable when we are talking about two identical things. If two things
are identical, then it is necessary that they are identical. This rule gives us
the possibility of substituting equals for equals in modal contexts, therefore
we do not want to lose (NI). However, there is a problem with this rule:
(NI) is valid in first-order modal logic when equality denotes extensional
identity, but it is a source of some logical puzzles like the famous one posed
by Frege regarding the “morning star” and the “evening star”. Considering
that m stands for “morning star” and e for “evening star” and knowing
that both names designate the very same thing, i.e., the planet Venus, we
can obtain as an instance of (NI) the following modal sentence:2
m = e→ (m = e)
The puzzle appears when we give to  an interpretation in terms of
propositional attitudes like “the ancient Greeks knew”. In this case, from
Difference of objects I express by difference of signs.” (§ 5.53). In fact he indicates: “to
say of two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is
identical with itself is to say nothing at all” (§ 5.5303).
2A good explanation of this issue can be found in [7], pp. 140–150.
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the previous sentence and the fact that m = e, which is supposed to be true
because both denote Venus, then by Modus Ponens we have as conclusion
that
(m = e)
which can be read as:
The ancient Greeks knew that the morning star was the evening star
which is a false proposition, since the identification of the morning star
and the evening star with the very same object was something discovered
in subsequent years.
The other rule, (SI), can also be exemplified with our previous notation
as
m = e→ (ϕ(m)→ ϕ(e))
which can be read as
if the morning star and the evening star denote the same thing,
then what can be said of the morning star can also be said of
the evening star
but this is not true because if we interpret ϕ to be “was known to be the
morning star by the ancient Greeks”, the truth value of ϕ(m) is true but
the truth value of ϕ(e) is just false.
Therefore, regarding modal logic and equality we have some issues to
solve if we do not want to reject any support to modal logic – as Quine, [17],
for example, did. When we study the previous puzzles in depth, what turns
out to be problematic is the introduction of terms other than variables.
We took this example because of its paradigmatical character even
though it can be misleading, as here there are two different problems in-
volved. One problem has to do with descriptions and we know that even in
classical first-order logic descriptions are difficult terms to deal with. But
the (NI) presents also some difficulties when we have function symbols and
constants whose denotation vary from world to world. The same formula
m = e→ (m = e)
is false when we interpret m as 1 + 1 and e as 10 because 1 + 1 = 10 is
true in binary number system but false in other number systems, like the
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decimal one. If we give to  an interpretation in terms of “all number
systems”, this formula
1 + 1 = 10→ (1 + 1 = 10)
does not qualify for an instance of a reliable axiom. As we have already
mentioned, the formula is problematic when we use terms other than rigid
variables.
Since identity is not definable in first-order modal logic, it has to be
introduced as primitive. If we want to interpret equality as the identity
relation, then we need to consider normal models. In a normal model
M = 〈W,R,D,F〉
the equality symbol would always be interpreted as the identity relation on
the domain:
(F(=))(w) = IdD
for each w ∈W . In such a model the formula
x = y
is true at the world w in the structureM under assignment g if and only if
the identity relation holds between the objects denoted by the application
of the assignment function g to the variables:
[[x = y]]
M,g,w
= T iff g(x) = g(y)
Since the interpretation of variables range over the objects in the do-
main of the model, there is no problem in assuming (NI) and (SI), because
both rules are valid when we are dealing with objects: if two objects are
identical then they are identical at every world of the model and they can
also be substituted without change in the truth value of a given formula.
When we move to formulas with terms other than variables, (NI) and (SI)
become untenable. Intensional terms, whose interpretation varies at each
world, were the cause of the puzzles we have previously indicated.
One approach to the combination of equality with terms is the proposal
of Hughes and Cresswell.3 The radical solution they offer is to eliminate
terms other than variables, so narrowing the equality relation to objects.
3See [13], pp. 330–335.
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This method gets rid of the problem, but constant and function symbols
have to be eliminated. As a matter of fact, the equality relation is genuine
identity, but intensions are not taken into account. However, the authors
propose that in case we wanted to deal with intensions in our language we
must renounce to the (NI) principle and weaken (SI) to formulas ϕ free of
modal operators. These systems in which (NI) does not hold and (SI) is
weaken are called contingent identity systems. In these systems, equality
between terms is a contingent relation.
Another possibility is to introduce two equality symbols, one for vari-
ables, x = y, and another for intensional terms, τ1 ≈ τ2. Fitting introduces
a new equality symbol between intensional terms4
τ1 ≈ τ2 ↔Df 〈λx, y.y = x〉(τ1, τ2)
The interpretation in a normal model of the previous relation being
[[τ1 ≈ τ2]]
M,g,w
= T iff [[ τ1]]
M,g,w = [[τ2]]
M,g,w
This allows us to compare the behavior of axiom (NI) for both equality
symbols. The axiom (NI) when equality is only between variables
(x = y)→ (x = y)
is valid because x = y affirms that the objects that are the values of x and
y are the same. When the new equality symbol applies for terms other
than variables, axiom (NI)
τ1 ≈ τ2 → (τ1 ≈ τ2)
is not valid because what τ1 ≈ τ2 states is that τ1 and τ2 designate the
same thing, and if they are not rigid, their designation can change from
world to world.
In conclusion, whereas x = y expresses that the objects are the same
and can be taken as the identity relation, τ1 ≈ τ2 says that the terms τ1 and
τ2 designate the same object. In this sense, if we want to accept (NI) for
≈ we would be expressing a notion stronger than that of simple equality,
namely it would have the characteristics of synonymy :
x = y asserts that the objects that are the values of x and y
are the same [...] t ≈ u asserts that the terms t and u designate
4See [7], pp. 204–205.
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the same object, which is quite a different thing. If x and y
are the same object, the object is, and always will be, one, and
hence (x = y) follows. But if t and u happen to designate the
same object, they might fail to do so under other circumstances,
so (t ≈ u) does not follow. In fact, (t ≈ u) expresses a notion
considerably stronger than that of simple equality – it has the
characteristics of synonymy. ([7], p. 205.)
In conclusion, in first-order modal logic the rules of (NI) and (SI) apply
well to variables and rigid terms but not to non-rigid intensional terms.
2.2. Modal Type Theory
In Types, Tableaus, and Go¨del’s God, [8], Melvin Fitting has developed
a novel approach to higher-order modal logic. Fitting’s work has proved
influential. Syntactically, it uses modal operators, but dispenses with the
function-argument syntax usual in type theory in favor of a predicate-
term syntax reminiscent of first-order logic. However, it is his semantic
innovation which is likely to be enduring: the use of intensional models, a
mechanism which makes it possible to avoid restrictions to rigid terms.
In his modal type theory Fitting, in [8], p. 92, introduces equality as
a primitive predicate and he stipulates that it has to be interpreted as the
identity relation on each domain of the family of domains in the model.
Given a modal model
M = 〈W,R,D,F〉
if =〈α,α〉 is an equality constant symbol, F(=〈α,α〉) is the identity relation
on [[α,D,W ]]. Where [[α,D,W ]] is the collection of objects of type α,
which can be extensional or intensional, with respect to D and W . This
collection is defined as follows:
1. If α is the type of individuals ι – let us remember that Fitting does not
have functional types nor a type of proposition – then [[ι,D,W ]] = D.
2. [[〈β1, . . . , βn〉, D,W ]] = ℘([[β1, D,W ]]× · · · × [[βn, D,W ]])
3. [[↑ α,D,W ]] = [[α,D,W ]]W , where ↑ α is an intensional type.
In his type theoretical calculus,5 Fitting adds equality by including equality
axioms in his tableau system. These equality axioms – which are formal-
izations of the Leibniz’s principle – are sentences of the following form
5See [8], p. 115 and also p. 69.
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∀a∀b[a = b↔ ∀c(c(a)→ c(b))]
where = is of type 〈α, α〉, for some α, then a and b are of type α and c is of
type 〈α〉. In this case the equality relation is not the prototypical identity.
3. Equality and Identity in Hybrid Logic
3.1. Nominals and the satisfaction operator in Hybrid Logic
In Modal Logic: A Semantic Perspective [5] Patrick Blackburn and Johan
van Benthem identify the expressive weakness of basic modal logic as the
lack of a mechanism to express in the language identity of worlds; neither
the accessibility relation between worlds can be referred to. This lack of
expressivity is an obvious weak as in the spirit of the Kripke semantics is
the consideration of modalities as quantifiers over worlds. The basic hybrid
language is the modal solution to this deficiency.
The two innovations of basic hybrid logic are the nominals and the
satisfaction operators.
The first idea is to add special propositional symbols called nominals to
an orthodox modal language, and to establish that in every model, nominals
are true at precisely one world. A nominal names its denotation by being
true there and there only.
The second idea is to add satisfaction operators. These are modalities
of the form @i, where i can be any nominal. The intended semantics is as
follows: a formula of the form @iϕ says that ϕ is satisfied at the (unique)
world named by the nominal i. Note that a formula of the form @iϕ is
either true at all worlds, or false at all worlds: if ϕ is true at the world
named by i, then @iϕ is true at all worlds w; otherwise it is (everywhere)
false.
In particular, formulas of form @ij, together with @i♦j are extremely
important in hybrid logic. The formula @ij asserts that i and j name the
same point. That is, @ij is a modal way of expressing what i = j would
express in classical logic. Indeed, it is easy to see that the following basic
hybrid formulas, which express the reflexivity, symmetry and transitivity
of equality, respectively, are all validities:
@ii @ij → @ji @ij ∧@jk → @ik
On the other hand, formulas of the form @i♦j express the accessibility
relation and allows to define relevant properties this relation might have;
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some of them are undefinable in orthodox modal logic, like irreflexivity or
trichotomy.
@i¬♦i @ij ∨@i♦j ∨@j♦i
Hybrid logic adds then to modal logic mechanisms for naming worlds,
asserting equalities between worlds and describing accessibility relations.
Since we can create also rigidified terms with the satisfaction operator of
the form @iτ , we can apply to these rigid terms the rules (NI) and (SI)
without any problem.
3.2. Hybrid Type Theory
In Completeness in Hybrid Type Theory, [4], equality is introduced as prim-
itive and its interpretation varies from world to world. Given two mean-
ingful expressions a and b of type α 6= t, we can have as a meaningful
expression of type t:
aα = bα
whose interpretation is
[[aα = bα]]
M,g,w
= T iff [[aα]]
M,g,w
= [[bα]]
M,g,w
In the same paper, the axioms referring to equality are restricted to
rigids. Rigid expressions have the same denotation at all worlds; good
examples are⊤, ⊥, variables and any expressions prefixed by an @ operator.
The set RIGIDS of rigid meaningful expressions is defined inductively
as follows:
RIGIDS ::= ⊥|⊤|vα |@iθα |λvβaα |f〈β,α〉bβ |aβ = bβ |¬ϕt |ϕt ∧ ψt |∀vαϕt,
where θα ∈ MEα and aα, bβ ,f〈β,α〉, ϕ, ψ ∈ RIGIDS.
As axioms for equality we have reflexivity and rigid substitution:
1. Reflexivity: ⊢ aα = aα.
2. Substitution: For aα, bα rigid, ⊢ aα = bα → (dγ
aα
vα
= dγ
bα
vα
).
The completeness theorem of this logic follows Henkin’s pattern. In
particular, we want to prove that any consistent set of sentences has a
general model. The first step consists on extending the consistent set to
a maximal consistent set, but not any maximal consistent set will do. To
deal with the hybrid and modal components of our logic, we want the set
to be named, ∃−saturated and ♦−saturated. Using this set of sentences
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as an oracle, we build the model its formulas describe. The second step
is to establish equivalent relations between meaningful expressions of all
types using equality. These equivalence classes are the building blocks
of the (higher-order) domain of quantification. From the completeness
proof of type theory, in [10], we take the idea of defining a function Φ on
equivalent classes and simultaneously defining the domains of the hierarchy
as functions. From the completeness proof of first-order logic, in [9], we take
the idea of building the basic domains out of equivalent classes; namely,
classes of nominals for the universe of worlds, and equivalent classes of
constants for the individual domain. In the present situation the terms
must be rigids. Instead of following the usual procedure via canonical
models we use a combined version of the completeness theorem for type
theory and first-order logic.
In [6] we describe in depth the relationship between his ideas and that
novel completeness proof.
4. The Kingdom of Identity
In [16] we were interested in how to define identity using other logical con-
cepts and we arrived to the conclusion that in case you want the proper
identity as interpretation of equality you need higher order logic with stan-
dard semantics, and so you sacrifice the calculus.
Now we will follow the opposite scheme. Identity is taken as a primitive
logical concept and we are interested in the definition of the other logical
concepts (connectives and quantifiers) in terms of the equality symbol (in-
terpreted as the identity relation), using also lambda abstraction. The idea
of reducing to identity other logical concepts is an old one that goes back to
Tarski, Ramsey and Quine. It was Ramsey who raised the whole subject,
as both Henkin6 and Andrews7 exemplified with this same Ramsey’s quote
[18]:
The preceding and other considerations let Wittgenstein to
the view that mathematics does not consist of tautologies, but
of what he called ‘equations’, for which I should prefer to sub-
stitute ‘identities’... (It) is interesting to see whether a theory
6In [12], p. 33.
7In [3], p. 67, he declares that in 1962 he copied that quote of Ramsey into his
journal.
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of mathematics could not be constructed with identities for its
foundations. I have spent a lot of time developing such a theory,
and found that it was faced with what seemed to me insuperable
difficulties. ([18], p. 18.)
In 1963 Henkin published A Theory of Propositional Types, [11]. In this
paper he offers a semantics and a complete calculus for a logic exclusively
based on lambda and equality. The paper was followed by Andrews, A re-
duction of the axioms for the theory of propositional type theory, [1]. Peter
Andrews, in a very personal and touching paper, A Bit of History Related
to Equality as a Logical Primitive, [3], relates the early history of his and
Henkin’s interest on the subject in the early sixties as well as the story of
his radical reduction of axioms. During the 1961–62 academic year Henkin
was at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton on a Guggenheim
Fellowship. At that time, Andrews was there working on his thesis under
the advice of Alonzo Church, who had been the director of Henkin’s thesis
in 1947. Let us quote Andrews:
On several occasions I suggested to Henkin that he simply
incorporate my proofs into his paper, but he insisted that I
publish a separate paper presenting these proofs, and he wrote
a very complimentary letter to Andrzej Mostowski (the editor
of Fundamenta Mathematicae) recommending that my paper be
published immediately following his own paper. He was very
concerned that my paper be easy to read as well as technically
correct, and made a number of suggestions about it. After we
had discussed a number of ideas related to Axiom H2 ((A0 ≡
Tn) ≡ A0), Henkin found a way to derive it, but he didn’t want
to write an addendum to my addendum to his paper, so he told
me to simply include his proof of Axiom H2 in my paper. ([3],
p. 69).
The identity relation on the set of truth values {T, F} is the bicondi-
tional connective. Using identity on truth values we cannot define connec-
tives whose truth tables have a value T on an odd number of lines, not even
with identity and negation. In Lesniewski logic, with identity and quan-
tification over propositions, negation can be defined by ∀X0(¬X0 ≡ (X0 ≡
∀Y0Y0)). When quantifiers over higher propositional types are allowed,
expressivity improves and Tarski was able to define conjunction by
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∀X0Y0(X0 ∧ Y0 ≡ ∀G(0)[(G(0)X0 ≡ G(0)T0) ≡ Y0])
Instead of using quantifiers, one can use Church’s lambda abstraction and
define not only connectives but also quantifiers in terms of identity and
lambda. This was first observed by Quine.
4.1. Lambda and Equality in Propositional Type Theory
We briefly present the hierarchy of propositional types as well as the lan-
guage and its semantics using Henkin’s definition in [11].
The hierarchy of propositional types, PT, is the least class of sets
containing D0, which is closed under passage from Dα and Dβ to Dβα.
D0 is the truth values set, D0 = {T, F}, while Dαβ is the set of all functions
which maps Dβ to Dα.
8 The formal language contains variables for each
propositional type, the lambda abstractor, λ, and a collection of equality
constants, Q(0α)α, one for each type α.
In this language, all connectives and quantifiers are definable; that is,
using only the biconditional Q(00)0 and λ, the remaining connectives as well
as the quantifiers ∀Xα – for each propositional variable of any propositional
type α – are presented as defined operators.
Definition 1 (Logical constants). In [11], pp. 326–327, Henkin defines
the following expressions:9
1. TN ::= ((λX0X0) ≡ (λX0X0))
2. FN ::=
(
(λX0X0) ≡
(
λX0T
N
))
3. ¬ ::=
(
λX0
(
FN ≡ X0
))
4. ∧ ::= λX0
(
λY0 (λf00 (f00X0 ≡ Y0)) ≡
(
λf00
(
f00T
N
)))
5. ∀XαA0 ::=
(
(λXαA0) ≡
(
λXαT
N
))
The intuition behind these definitions is rather clear, with the only
possible exception of ∧, the conjunction operator. This is probably why, in
his expository paper of 1975 [12], Henkin gave another and easier definition
of conjunction, this time using set-relational abstractor instead of lambda
notation.
The use of Church’s λ-notation for functional abstraction is
not as widely known as the notions of set – and relational –
8Nowadays we don’t use this reverse notation for types and we say that the domain
of functions from Dα to Dβ is Dαβ .
9We would use the symbol ≡ instead of Q(0α)α, for any α.
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abstraction made familiar by Russell and Whitehead through
the Principia. It has therefore seemed to me worthwhile to
sketch below a ‘translation’ of the ideas of my earlier paper (as
improved by Andrews) ([12], pp. 33–34).
The new definition is in page 36 of the same paper [12]:
∧ abbreviates
{
X0Y0 | ∀G(0)[(G(0)X0 ≡ G(0)T0) ≡ Y0]
}
The definition of ∧ offered by Andrews in page 349 of [2] is
∧000 stands for [λX0λY0
(
λg000(g000T
NTN
)
] ≡ [λg000(g000X0Y0)]
and his explanation reads: “The expression [λg000(g000X0Y0)] can be used
to represent the ordered pair 〈X0, Y0〉 and the conjunction X0 ∧ Y0 is true
iff X0 and Y0 are both true, i.e., iff
〈
TN, TN
〉
≡ 〈X0, Y0〉. Hence X0 ∧ Y0
can be expressed by the formula [λg000(g000X0Y0)] ≡ [λg000(g000T0T0)].”
([2], p. 160).
4.2. Nameability
This very succinct language that only uses λ and ≡ is so powerful that you
can give a proper name to every object in PT. This is possible because in
this hierarchy each type is finite and the already mentioned problem of hav-
ing more objects than formulas does not appear. Names and denotations
do match: “In particular, we shall associate, which each element x of an
arbitrary type Dα, a closed formula x
n of type α such that (xn)d = x”([11],
p. 326).
Names for the basic objects T and F of type 0 are given in definition
1 above. Now we wonder what is the name of the function f which maps
every element of the finite type Dα (say Dα = {y1, ...,yq}) into Dβ . The
name for the function f which maps every yi to the corresponding f(yi) in
Dβ is given by the formula
fn := λXα.Zβ .[(Xα ≡ (y1)
n) ∧ (Zβ ≡ f(y1)
n)] ∨ . . .
. . . ∨ [(Xα ≡ (yq)
n) ∧ (Zβ ≡ f(yq)
n)]
To introduce fn we need to formalize the following: when variable Xα
is just the name of object yi – that is, Xα ≡ (yi)
n – function f matches
it to the unique Zβ naming f(yi) – that is, Zβ ≡ f(yi)
n. The names of
the objects of types α and β as well as the descriptor operator are used in
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the inductive definition of names for type (βα). To introduce the last one
Henkin defines an election function t(α) for each type:
For any arbitrary type α let t(α) be the function of Dα(0α) such
that, for any f ∈ D0α, (t
(α)f) is the unique element x ∈ Dα
for which (fx) = T , in case there is such a unique element x,
or else (t(α)f) = aα if there is no x, or if there are more than
one x, such that (fx) = T . We shall show inductively that for
each α there is a closed formula ια(0α) such that (ια(0α))
d =
t(α). Then for any formula A0 and variable Xα we shall set
(XαA0) = (ια(0α)(λXαA0)) ([11], p. 328).
In the above definition aα serves as the denotation of improper descrip-
tions. The setting of these aα is done by induction on types: for type 0
we just take a0 = F , for type (αβ) we take the constant function fαβ with
value aα for every element of Dβ , where aα is the already chosen element
in Dα. Thus, fαβx = aα for each x ∈ Dβ .
4.3. A calculus for PTT based on identity
For the theory of propositional types, Henkin not only defines all logical
constants and quantifiers with lambda and equality, he also gave, for the
first time, a complete axiomatic treatment of propositional type theory
based on λ and equality rules. The axioms were chosen to express basic
properties of equality. Let us quote Henkin’s seven axioms and Replacement
Rule.
5.1.1. Axiom Schema 1. Aα ≡ Aα
5.1.2. Axiom Schema 2. (A0 ≡ T
N) ≡ A0
5.1.3. Axiom Schema 3. (TN ∧ Fn) ≡ Fn
5.1.4. Axiom Schema 4. (g00T
N ∧ g00F
N) ≡ (∀X0(g00X0))
5.1.5. Axiom Schema 5. (Xβ ≡ Yβ) → ((fαβ ≡ gαβ) →
((fαβXβ) ≡ (gαβYβ)))
5.1.6. Axiom Schema 6. (∀Xβ(fαβXβ ≡ gαβXβ) → (fαβ ≡
gαβ))
5.1.7. Axiom Schema 7. ((λXβBα)Aβ) ≡ Cα, where Cα is
obtained from Bα by replacing each occurrence of Xβ in
Bα by an occurrence of Aβ , providing no such occurrence
of Xβ is within a part of Bα which is a formula beginning
‘λYγ ’ where Yγ is a variable free in Aβ .
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5.2. By the Rule of Replacement we refer to the ternary relation
on formulas of type 0 which holds for 〈A′0, C0, D0〉 if and
only if A′0 = (Aα ≡ Bα) for some formulas Aα and Bα
and D0 is obtained from C0 by replacing one occurrence
of Aα by an occurrence of Bα. When this situation holds
for 〈Aα ≡ Bα, C0, D0〉 we shall say that D0 is obtained by
Rule R from Aα ≡ Bα and C0. ([11], p. 330).
The already mentioned Andrews improvement, [1], consists in a reduc-
tion of the axioms. In particular, Andrews eliminates Axioms 1, 2 and 3,
simplifies Axiom 5 in this form
(fα0 ≡ gα0)→ (h0(α0)fα0 ≡ h0(α0)gα0)
and replaces Axiom 6 by
∀Xβ((fαβXβ ≡ gαβXβ) ≡ (fαβ ≡ gαβ))
What are the basic properties of equality chosen for this calculus? Ax-
iom 4 expresses the fact that there are only two truth values, T and F in the
domain D0 and could be understood as a law of excluded middle. Axiom 5
expresses a form of Leibniz’ law of equality. Axiom 6 is just extensionality,
and the rule of Replacement allows to replace equals by equals.
What about reflexivity? As you see it was Axiom 1 in Henkin calculus
but Andrews proved in [1] that it was derivable from Axiom 7 – in this form
((λX0Aα)X0) ≡ Aα – and the Rule of replacement of equals by equals.
4.4. Completeness in Propositional Type Theory
Now we would like to explain the method Henkin developed in this beautiful
proof.
The important result from where the completeness theorem easily fol-
lows has the form of a substitution lemma, but instead of being a semantic
metatheorem, it is a theorem of the calculus:
Lemma. Let Aα be any formula and ϕ an assignment. Let
A
(ϕ)
α be the formula obtained from Aα by substituting, for each
free occurrence of any variable Xβ in Aα, the formula (ϕXβ)
n.
Then ⊢ A
(ϕ)
α ≡ (V (Aα, ϕ))
n. ([11], p. 341).
The obvious question we ask is, how to prove that |= A0 implies ⊢ A0
for any formula of type 0?
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Proposition 2. Lemma implies completeness.
Proof: If A0 is closed then |= A0 implies V (Aα, ϕ) = T for any assignment
ϕ. Thus the lemma gives ⊢ A0 ≡ (V (Aα, ϕ))
n which turns to be ⊢ A0 ≡ T
n,
where Tn is the name of the truth value true.
But using the calculus, in particular, axiom 2 – of this form, (A0 ≡
Tn) ≡ A0 – and rule of replacement R we obtain the desired result, ⊢ A0.
In case A0 were a valid formula but not a sentence, we pass from
A0 to the sentence ∀Xγ1 ...XγrA0 – where freeV ar(A0) = {Xγ1 ...Xγr} –
. We know that |= ∀Xγ1 ...XγrA0, and using the previous argument, ⊢
∀Xγ1 ...XγrA0. Applying the rules of the calculus, we obtain, ⊢ A0.
5. Conclusion
We consider the idea of reducing other logical concepts to identity as a
very fertile notion. Following this line of thought, Manzano, Martins and
Huertas, in [14], have developed a logic based on Propositional Type Theory
(PTT) and on Equational Logic (EL); in both logics, identity plays a central
role. The resulting logic: Equational Hybrid Propositional Type Theory
(EHPTT), incorporates also hybrid operators in order to deal with the
difficulties arising in intensional contexts. The language EHPTT includes
as logical symbols ≡ and λ from PTT and ♦ and @ from HL. The structures
used to interpret the language contain a hierarchy of propositional types,
an algebra (a non-empty set with functions) and a Kripke frame. The
completeness proof for this logic is proved in [15], incorporating results and
techniques introduced by Henkin in [9], [10] and [11]. EHPTT is a good
example of how to combine the different elements we have been finding out
through our promenade along the roads of identity, equality, nameability
and completeness.
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